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bstract
hen a corporation presents a reorganization plan, it expects its creditors to approve the plan. This paper provides empirical evidence regarding
he likelihood of approval based on reorganization plans for creditors in Brazil that require approval by employees; and by secure and unsecure
ebtholders. This paper involves a descriptive analysis of the main characteristics of reorganization plans by type of vote. Using a sample of 120
eorganization plans proposed by corporations from 2005 to 2014, we find that the labor class of creditors is likely to approve the reorganization
lan even when the plan is rejected; plans with more heterogeneous payment for classes are less likely to be accepted; plans are less likely to be
ccepted when there are more unsecure creditors; and plans with divestment proposals are more likely to be accepted. Finally, as expected given
he seniority position of secured debt, plans are less likely to be accepted when the portion of secured debt is higher, and the reverse is true for
nsecured debt.
 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
eywords: Corporate restructuring; Reorganization plan; Bankruptcy
esumo
uando uma empresa apresenta um plano de recuperac¸ão judicial, espera-se que o plano seja aprovado por seus credores. Neste artigo, apresenta-
e a evidência empírica sobre a votac¸ão dos credores trabalhistas, com garantia real e quirografário e a probabilidade de aprovac¸ão do plano de
ecuperac¸ão judicial no Brasil. O estudo aborda uma análise descritiva das principais características dos planos de recuperac¸ão judicial por classe
e voto. Utilizando uma amostra de 120 planos de recuperac¸ão judicial apresentados por empresas entre 2005 e 2014, os resultados sugerem
ue: credores trabalhistas estão propensos a aprovar o plano de recuperac¸ão mesmo quando o plano é rejeitado pelas demais classes; planos com
ropostas de pagamento mais heterogêneas para as três classes de credores possuem menor chance de serem aceitos; a chance de aprovac¸ão do
lano diminui nos casos em que mais credores quirografários participam da votac¸ão; e planos com proposta de venda de ativos possuem maior
hance de serem aprovados. Finalmente, maior concentrac¸ão da dívida na classe com garantia real diminui a chance de aprovac¸ão do plano, e o
ontrário ocorre na classe quirografária.
 2017 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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When a company faces financial distress it may choose to
evise a reorganization plan. Such a plan must be presented to its
reditors, who ultimately vote to approve the reorganization plan
r to subject the company to bankruptcy proceedings. This paper
xamines this decision making process. We present empirical
vidence regarding the approval of reorganization plans, as we
elieve that a clear gap exists in how each class of creditors
ecides to approve or reject these plans during the creditors’
eneral meeting. Collectively, our results show that debtholders’
ehavior depends on their claim rights. Moreover, asset disposal
acilitates the approval of reorganization plans.
The literature on law and finance states that debt restructu-
ing can be considered a complex decision process involving a
rm and its lenders, and stresses that debt reorganization plans
nd claimholders’ relative recoveries in court depend on how
isputes between creditors are resolved (Gilson, Hotchkiss, &
uback, 2000). Empirical evidence demonstrates the impor-
ance of bankruptcy law to the credit market and enforcement
y courts.
The interaction between debtors and representative credi-
ors in situations of financial distress has received considerable
ttention. Kordana and Posner (1999) study bargaining with mul-
iple creditors, incorporating the operation of the voting rules
or companies filing Chapter 11. Moreover, Winton (1995),
olton and Scharfstein (1996), Bris and Welch (2005), Hege
nd Mella-Barral (2005), Bisin and Rampini (2006), Hackbart,
ennessy, and Leland (2007) and von Thadden, Berglöf, and
oland (2010) all present multiple-creditor models considering
x ante  contracting problems or ex  post  analysis of those prob-
ems stemming from the individual and collective liquidation
ights of creditors.
We provide an analysis based on Kaplan and Stromberg
2003) and Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) using databases suffer-
ng from sample bias not present in data from quasi-experiments.
herefore, we do not address causality in our study; this paper
rovides a descriptive analysis. To our knowledge, there is a lack
f empirical explanations of how creditors decide to vote on reor-
anization plans. Moreover, this is the first study to examine the
ikelihood of acceptance of reorganization plans by considering
he decision process of each class of claimholders and the char-
cteristics of the plans in Brazil. In 2005, Law 11,101 took effect
n Brazil with the goal of providing creditors with better condi-
ions for reorganizing or liquidating companies facing financial
istress.
As Kordana and Posner (1999) note, little attention has been
evoted to the examination of the correspondence between vot-
ng rules during reorganizations. von Thadden et al. (2010)
uggest that many conflicts of interests are solved ex  post  during
he bankruptcy or reorganization period. Hence, our descrip-
ive results provide evidence on the characteristics surrounding
reditor’s decision making processes.
The literature on reorganization and bankruptcy provides
xtensive theoretical and empirical analysis of debt restructu-
ing. From an ex  ante  perspective, studies try to explain the
mpacts of bankruptcy on firms’ capital structure decisions.
r
a
iment Journal 53 (2018) 49–62
oreover, they try to understand why firms borrow from multi-
le creditors, although it could make the future resolution of
istress more complex. The ex  post  approach aims to show
he best alternatives for sorting out claims in situations where
nancial distress has already occurred.
Haugen and Senbet (1978) state that bankruptcy risk impacts
rms’ capital structure decisions. Similarly, the choice of debt
tructure influences what occurs in bankruptcy according to
ghion, Hart, and Moore (1992). From an ex  ante  perspec-
ive, several studies analyze the importance of bankruptcy with
espect to debtors’ investments, leverage and incentives prior
o the bankruptcy situation, such as Cornelli and Felli (1997),
chwartz (1998), Berkovitch and Israel (1999), and Bebchuck
2002) among others. These researchers elucidate the conflict
etween debtors and representative creditors. Unfortunately, in
his paper we cannot control for ex  ante  variables because the
ajority of our data do not provide financial statements that
llow this.
We present empirical evidence about the characteristics of
oting on reorganization plans by separately conducting the
nalyses according to the outcome of the vote on the plan. Hence,
his paper investigates a very important issue from not only a the-
retical but also a managerial perspective. We aim to understand
ow different classes of creditors vote in approving or rejecting
ecovery plans by controlling for the conditions specified in the
eorganization plans. We analyze data collected from 2005 to
014. We use 2005 as the starting year because the new Brazilian
ankruptcy law entered into force in this year.
Under the new Brazilian bankruptcy law, creditors play a
ore important role in company restructuring because of the
ew voting procedure for reorganization plans. After choosing
o restructure its debt in court, a firm must create a reorganization
lan that presents a solution for its financial distress. Unlike
hapter 11 in the US bankruptcy code, Brazilian bankruptcy law
oes not require a claim administrator to organize and provide
nformation on all claims and claimholders. In the US, indenture
rustees act on behalf of creditors: therefore, claimholders do not
eet to vote on reorganization plans. Although creditors vote
y following a different procedure, Ponticelli (2012) shows that
imilarities exist between Brazilian bankruptcy law and the US
ankruptcy code and Anapolsky and Woods (2013) present more
etails about the similarities and differences in reorganization
ules between the two countries.
When a creditor does not approve the reorganization plan pre-
ented by a specific firm, the different classes of creditors decide
hether to allow recover or to subject the firm to bankruptcy
ogether in an Assembly, where the labor, secured and unsecured
reditors vote on the plan. All three classes of creditors must vote
o approve the plan. With regard to secured and unsecured cred-
tors, the plan must be accepted by a majority of creditors at
he meeting (number criteria) and at least half of the total debt
alue for each class must be represented during the vote (value
riteria).
By contrast, for labor creditors, only a majority vote is
equired (number criteria). These two criteria allow firms to
void opportunistic behavior from creditors, where some cred-
tors might refuse to approve the plan if they do not receive
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pecial treatment. If the plan is rejected, the firm enters
ankruptcy.
We use data from Vara  de  Falências  e  Recuperac¸ão Judicial
n São  Paulo  and from firms’ website. Based on data on 120
estructuring plans from 2005 to 2014 we find that the labor
lass of creditors approves the reorganization plan even when
he plan is ultimately rejected. Moreover, we find that approved
lans have a smaller portion of debt discounted and higher grace
eriod on average than rejected and modified plans. Further,
ejected reorganization plans have higher disparities in payment
roposals within the same class of creditors, and reorganiza-
ion plans that were modified during the creditors’ meeting have
igher disparities in payment proposals among the classes of
reditors.
To evaluate the likelihood of acceptance of reorganization
lans, we run probit regressions. We find that asset disposal
ncreases the likelihood of restructuring plan approval. One pos-
ible interpretation of this finding is that collateral is an important
eterminant of recovery plan acceptance. Creditors seem to gen-
rally prefer that firms liquidate a portion of their assets since it
acilitates their ability to receive cash. We also find that secured
ebt creditors have lower incentives than the other classes of
reditors to accept reorganization plans; moreover, since they
re the last class of creditors to receive payment after liquida-
ion, unsecured creditors are more likely to accept reorganization
lans. We also find that high debt values from banks in the junior
lass are negatively related to plan acceptance and that payment
isparities among all classes of creditors seem to reduce the
ikelihood of acceptance.
This paper is structured as follows: The second section dis-
usses the related literature. The third section describes our data.
he fourth section describes the empirical strategy of analysis.
he fifth section reports empirical results and a related discus-
ion. The final section concludes the paper.
elated  literature
The implementation of a bankruptcy process by law raises
ome concerns regarding its effects on security prices, default
osses, priority rules and financial reorganization. According to
ilson (2012), academic research on bankruptcy has been con-
entrated in four main areas: bankruptcy resolution, bankruptcy
osts (Haugen & Senbet, 1978, 1988), governance changes
n bankruptcy and the effects of bankruptcy on stock prices
Eberhart, Moore, & Roenfeldt, 1990). This research focuses
n bankruptcy resolution.
We are interested in understanding creditors’ decision mak-
ng about the restructuring process. According to Djankov,
cLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) there is a group of papers that
onnect legal protection for creditors and judicial efficiency.
or instance, Claessens and Klapper (2005) argue that greater
udicial efficiency is strongly associated with greater use of
ankruptcy, although the combination of stronger creditor rights
nd greater judicial efficiency leads to less use of bankruptcy.
We would like to highlight the studies that seem to explain
hy the resolution of financial distress varies across countries.
ennaioli and Rossi (2010) show that strong creditor protection
q
a
w
ament Journal 53 (2018) 49–62 51
ncreases the efficiency of the resolution of financial distress
ecause it provides judicial incentives.
Based on a sample of 49 countries, La Porta, Lopez-De-
ilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that countries with
oor investor protection (legal rules and quality of law enforce-
ent) have smaller and narrower capital markets. To construct
 measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement, Djankov, Hart,
cLiesh, and Shleifer (2008) compare debt enforcement for
he same kind of business in 88 different countries. They find
hat institutions that regulate insolvency usually perform poorly
wing to their inefficient bankruptcy procedures.
Penati and Zingales (1997) reveal the importance of under-
tanding the legal environment in which a restructuring process
ccurs because of its effects on parties’ outside options. For
xample, the Italian bankruptcy code includes two main pro-
edures (liquidation and reorganization) for addressing an
nsolvent company. In the case of bankruptcy liquidation, the
ankruptcy court appoints a trustee who shuts down the firm
nd sells its assets (or even sells the whole business). The abso-
ute priority rule then determines how the proceeds of the sale
re divided among the claimants (Franks & Torous, 1989, 1994).
Since we focus on the reorganization process for distressed
rms, it is important to examine guidance provided regarding
he power of law. In this regard, Platt and Platt (2008) examine
actors that seem to predict financial distress in the US, Europe
nd Asia: they find that differences in accounting rules, legal
ractices, environmental laws and business practices between
egions may limit the degree of convergence in the area of finan-
ial distress. Indeed, bankruptcy law varies considerably around
he world.
Several studies have examined the main characteristics of
estructuring processes around the world. According to Franks,
yborg, and Torous (1996) and Hotchkiss et al. (2008), who
pecifically focus on the restructuring of distressed firms in the
K, Sweden, France, Germany and Japan, the degree to which
ompanies’ business is protected from creditors also varies con-
iderably.
In studying the primary effects of the new Brazilian
ankruptcy law, Araujo and Funchal (2009) find that the new law
as had a rapid and strong impact on the number of bankrupt-
ies in Brazil. According to these authors, expansion of the
redit market is observable. Moreover, Kadiyala (2011) investi-
ates the impact of bankruptcy law reform on capital markets in
razil and, based on an empirical analysis of four different stock
ndexes (Bovespa,  IBX,  IGCX  and  ITAG), shows that aggregate
tock market indexes reacted positively by the time that new
ules were signed into law. These results are consistent with
hose of La Porta et al. (1997), who find that better bankruptcy
aws lead to increased equity values.
Following Quian and Straham’s (2007) argument that
he quality of the legal environment shapes the character-
stics and terms of bank loans around the world, Araujo,
erreira, and Funchal (2012) evaluate the empirical conse-
uences of the bankruptcy reform on credit markets by using
 quasi-experimental approach to compare Brazilian firms
ith non-Brazilian firms (companies from Argentina, Chile
nd Mexico). The result shows that increased protection is
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esponsible for both an increase in the amount of long-term debt
nd a reduction in the cost of capital.
Funchal and Clovis (2009) study firms’ capital structure and
ankruptcy law design to examine the effect of changes in pri-
rities among creditors and find a significant impact on firm’s
nancial policy in line with lower costs of capital.
Exploiting the quality of court enforcement across Brazil-
an judicial districts, Ponticelli (2012) shows that efficient court
nforcement helps sustain higher capital investment and pro-
uctivity for companies. Thus, firms that face better court
nforcement benefit in terms of access to external financing,
nvestment and productivity.
Moreover, De Assis (2012) present an interesting study
ocused on analyzing judicial recovery proceedings immediately
ollowing the implementation of the new bankruptcy law. This
aper provides some analysis of restructuring plans and shows
hat the average time to complete all stages of the proceedings
xceeds a reasonable amount of time. Our paper must corrob-
rate previous work since it intends to present and analyze
nformation provided in reorganization plans.
nalysis  of  the  approval  of  reorganization  plans
Under the new Brazilian bankruptcy law, court-based restruc-
uring permits different means of restructuring, such as a
otential change in corporate control, the stipulation of special
erms and conditions for payments of obligations, and the right
f veto for creditors regarding restructuring plans. The results
egarding the new Brazilian bankruptcy law show that many
ompanies have chosen to adopt a restructuring plan in order to
ddress their financial problems. Moreover, the total number of
estructuring cases has increased in each year after the new law
ntered into force. Until 2005, bankruptcy in Brazil was ruled
y Law 7661.
Law 7661 did not offer conditions for the recovery of eco-
omically viable companies that faced financial distress. The
ld reorganization procedure (known as concordata) only post-
oned corporate debt. Moreover, as the main shortcomings of
he previous system, the liquidation process was characterized
y extensive bureaucracy, optimal recovery could generally not
e achieved in situations of distress, and firms faced difficulties
n obtaining new debt to restructure their business. Moreover,
he insolvency process did not effectively protect credit rights
fter liquidation.
According to Funchal (2006), creditors play a more signifi-
ant role in the restructuring procedure under the new Brazilian
ankruptcy law because they are involved in the negotiation and
oting on the reorganization plan. Despite the improvements of
he new law, it complicates the process of resolving firms’ debts
y forcing heterogeneous creditors to vote together (Funchal,
006). As noted earlier, all three classes of creditors must vote to
pprove the final plan. However, Brown (1989) finds that hetero-
eneous groups of creditors are more concerned with receiving
uarantees, whereas homogenous creditors are primarily con-
erned with participating in the restructuring process.
Reorganization plans must be approved at the creditors’ meet-
ng, where creditors are divided into three classes for their vote. It
f
a
t
pment Journal 53 (2018) 49–62
s important to highlight that tax creditors and creditors holding
oans supported by fiduciary alienation of assets are not subject
o recovery: therefore, they do not vote on reorganization plans.
Secured creditors vote as a class and represent an amount up
o the value of their collateral. Moreover, when creditors demand
ore than their collateral value, they can vote as both secured and
nsecured creditors, and they then represent exactly the same
mount they own for each category. Debtors can indicate the
eriod that they believe to be reasonable by which to pay their
ecured and unsecured creditors. However, according to article
4 of Law 11.101/2005, debtors cannot stipulate a period greater
han one year for labor debt in their restructuring plan.
Once a company has decided to undergo court restructuring,
he process by which creditors’ acceptance or rejection of the
eorganization plan proceeds through the following steps:
. The firm must present the reorganization plan in court within
sixty days after deciding to undergo a restructuring process;
. The judge communicates that the recovery plan has been
received and sets a deadline for creditors to present any
objection;
. Labor, secured and unsecured creditors (or, potentially, only
one or two classes) vote on the reorganization plan to accept,
reject or postpone it in order to demand of additional changes.
All the three classes of creditors must vote to approve the
plan for it to be approved; otherwise, the firm undergoes
bankruptcy.
Further, the bankruptcy law establishes the following order
f debt priority when a firm opts for bankruptcy or when its
estructuring plan is rejected in the creditors’ meeting:
. Labor debt up to the limit of 150 minimum wages per worker;
. Secured debt up to the limit of the collateral;
. Tax debt;
. Payment for debtholders with specific and general privileges;
. Unsecured debt.
ata  description
We use data from different sources to create our sample.
irst, we collected some court restructuring plans from “Vara
e Falências  e  Recuperac¸ão Judicial” in São Paulo, we then
btained a wide variety of restructuring plans from Google®
ince the data are public and usually available on the websites
f firms and judicial trustees. We consider information from both
rivate and public companies’ restructuring plans.
Our sample includes 120 firms for which we have informa-
ion about labor, secured and unsecured funding from banks
nd nonbank creditors. Since 2005, there have been only a few
estructuring process for public companies: therefore, the main
art of our sample comprises private firms. We collected data
rom 3 different documents on firms’ reorganization processes,
nd we analyzed the reorganization plan itself, the minutes from
he creditors’ meeting and the relation of each creditor that
resents a description of the amount of money to be recovered.
V.A. Silva, R. Saito / RAUSP Manage
Table 1
Sector representation.
Sector # Firms %
Industrial 44 36.67
Consumer, noncyclical 38 31.67
Consumer, cyclical 18 15.00
Utilities 14 11.67
Energy 4 3.33
Basic materials 2 1.67
Sum 120 100.00
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Source: Own elaboration following the Bloomberg sector classification.
s Table 1 shows, our sample is more concentrated in the indus-
rial and noncyclical sectors and less concentrated in the basic
aterials sector.
Table 2 summarizes the basic statistics for each variable col-
ected from the documents mentioned above. The definitions
f the variables are also provided in the notes to the table. As
hown, firms’ average age (from birth to the restructuring date)
s approximately 31 years.
Regarding the number of banks, the statistics show that
pproximately seven banks are involved in the restructuring
rocess per firm.
ample  selection  issues
The data in our sample were not provided by a quasi-
xperiment. Since we collected our data by searching for
nformation provided on the websites of firms, lawyers and judge
rustees, our sample may present some kind of bias. Because we
ave a nonrandom sample, we can only analyze the possible
irection of the bias rather than completely eliminate it. One
w
i
l
able 2
escriptive statistics.
Total sam
ariable NOBS Measurem
abor debt% 120 % 
ecured debt% 120 % 
nsecured debt% 120 % 
ecured bank loan% 114 % 
nsecured bank loan% 114 % 
abor debt # 112 Numerica
ecured debt # 115 Numerica
nsecured debt # 115 Numerica
oncentration of top 10 creditors 109 % 
oncentration of top 10 creditors (no Banks) 109 % 
umber of Banks 110 Numerica
irm Age 111 Years 
ayment years 114 Years 
he table reports descriptive statistics from firms’ restructuring plans. The variable L
ebt (%) represents the portion of the second class of firm debt. The variable Unsecur
ortion of bank loans that constitute secured debt. Unsecured bank loan% shows the
nsecured # are the number of labor, secured and unsecured debtholders, respectivel
ighest amount of debt, and Top 10 (%, no banks) is the proportion of the debt held
ariable Number of Banks presents the number of banks operating in the list of cred
eeded to settle their debt. The variable Firm Age indicates the period of time from b
ource: own elaborationment Journal 53 (2018) 49–62 53
ossible type of bias may be related to the region as we have
 higher concentration of firms in the south and southeast and
nly a few firms in the north and northeast.
However, this distribution of firms is in line with the popula-
ions of the judicial districts in Brazil. The State of São  Paulo  has
he higher number of civil courts. Further, in his analysis of judi-
ial districts in Brazil, Ponticelli (2012) finds that the country
s divided into 2738 judicial districts, with a higher concentra-
ion of judicial districts and courts dealing with bankruptcy in
outheast and a higher concentration of companies in the south
nd southeast of Brazil. The characteristics of our sample are in
ine with these characteristics. Fig. 1 shows the portion of firms
n our sample by state.
Ponticelli (2012) noted that the State of São  Paulo  has a con-
entration of civil courts, which is consistent with our sample
ecause a greater number of observations were obtained from
he southeast, which had more than 10 different courts in São
aulo alone. Ponticelli also showed that court concentration in
he southeast is worse than in other regions and indicated that
ompanies in Brazil are extremely concentrated in the south
nd southeast. We do not believe that such characteristics can
ompletely eliminate a bias toward this region; however, we are
onfident that our data follow the characteristics of recovery in
razil as a whole.
Moreover, Brazilian judicial trustees are appointed by the
ourt, but a specific lawyer may receive more complicated cases
ased on his reputation or knowledge about bankruptcy situa-
ions. Fortunately, we can check the minutes of the Assembly to
etermine whether a lawyer represented the recovering firm or a
udicial trustee was in charge of the case. With such information,
e can determine whether there is a pattern related to lawyers
n our sample data. Our cases are spread out among different
awyers, which reduces the possibility that a specific lawyer is
ple
ent Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
0.033 0.0685 0 0.5547
0.178 0.223 0 0.9081
0.789 0.2314 0.085 1
0.361 0.4138 0 1
0.408 0.321 0 1
l 349.5 1064 0 7278
l 2.852 4.3774 0 31
l 306.7 472.73 2 2754
0.682 0.1891 0.173 0.994
0.329 0.2211 0.003 0.924
l 6.51 3.6086 0 18
31.33 23.22 4 120
11 4.14 3 22
abor debt (%) is the portion of the first class of firm debt. The variable Secured
ed is the portion of the third class of firm debt. Secured bank loan% shows the
 portion of bank loans that constitute unsecured debt. Labor #, Secured # and
y. Top 10 (%) is the proportion of the debt held by the 10 debtholders with the
 by the 10 debtholders with the highest amount of debt, excluding banks. The
itors. The variable Payment years is the period of time, as stated by the firms,
irth to the restructuring year.
54 V.A. Silva, R. Saito / RAUSP Management Journal 53 (2018) 49–62
Firms by state
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
SP RS GO SC RJ MT MG PE RO PA
State
Brazilian states:
MG = Minas geraisGO = Goias
PE = Pemambuco
RS = Rio grande do sul 
RO = Rondônia
SC = Santa catarina
MT = Mato grosso
RJ = Rio de janeiro
SP = Sao paulo
PA = Para
Fig. 1. Portion of firms in the sample by state.
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riving our result. Although we have shown the characteristics
f our data to analyze the potential for bias in our data we cannot
ake definitive conclusions since we do not have a random sam-
le. We are quite confident that any bias in our sample is related
he concentration of cases handled by lawyers and belonging to
articular regions.
mpirical  strategy  of  analysis
This paper involves both a descriptive and an econometric
nalysis of the main characteristics of reorganization plans by
ype of vote. It is important to highlight that we do not intend to
dentify a causal relation between the variables since we are not
onducting a controlled experiment provided by an exogenous
hock. We provide an initial analysis of reorganization plans by
ype of vote, and we then conduct an econometric analysis to
alculate controlled correlations between the independent vari-
bles and the likelihood that creditors initially accept the plan
i.e., without modification).
escriptive  analysis
This part of the paper aims to provide empirical evidence of
he characteristics of the reorganization plans by separating the
eorganization plans according to the Assembly results. Specif-
cally, since plans can be approved, modified or rejected, we
ecided to capture the characteristics of each plan and compare
hem according to the possible results of the Assembly. We fur-
her conduct a descriptive analysis on the proposal that debtors
resented to claimholders regarding payment. This part of the
nalysis examines the portion of debt discounted from the origi-
al debt value, the grace period suggested by debtors to postpone
he first payment and the correction form of the debt payment
rovided during the reorganization period.
p
r
1
cboration.
We also perform a descriptive analysis of disparities in
ayment proposals among creditors.
conometric  regressions
To identify which kind of outcome one can expect for a
estructuring plan, we decided to adopt a probit regression. Since
he readers of this paper likely come from different areas of
nowledge, we provide a brief description related to our empir-
cal model.
Our variable of interest is a dichotomous dependent variable
creditors must approve or reject the reorganization plan). There-
ore, our dependent variable is a nominal scale variable, taking
alues of 1 for approved plans and 0 otherwise. A researcher
an choose among several techniques to run a regression when
he dependent variable is binary, such as the Linear Probability
odel (LPM), the Logit Model or the Probit Model.
The LPM assumes that the probability of the dependent vari-
ble (to approve the plan, in this case) moves linearly with the
alue of the explanatory variables. Moreover, there is no guaran-
ee that the estimated value in the LPM model will lie between 0
nd 1. Hence, logit and probit models are the preferred choice for
odeling our decision making process since they fit a nonlinear
unction to the data and guarantee that the estimated proba-
ilities will lie between 0 and 1. These two models generally
resent similar results. The logit model considers the cumulative
istribution function of the logistic distribution, while the pro-
it model considers the cumulative distribution function of the
tandard normal distribution. Logit models are usually applied
hen researchers want to interpret coefficients of the regression
n terms of odds ratios (which is not our case). Logit models
resent slightly fatter tails and their conditional probability of
ejecting or approving the reorganization plan approaches 0 or
 at a slower rate compared to probit models. Therefore, we
hoose the probit model in our study.
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Our model aims to determine the likelihood that a firms’
estructuring plan is accepted when creditors do not demand
dditional changes. Therefore, we do not separate plans that
ere approved, modified or rejected in our econometric analysis
n order to run a multinomial probit regression. Modified plans
ave many of modifications from a specific group of creditors
hat define conditions for approving the plan. Hence, modified
lans were first rejected by creditors before being modified.
e decided to capture the likelihood that a firms’ restructu-
ing plan is accepted without additional changes. Therefore, our
esearch question is as follows: What are the main determinants
f reorganization plan acceptance for each class of creditors?
t a first glance, we would like to evaluate the factors that
ffect creditors’ decision about the reorganization plan. How
o heterogeneous creditors behave in the decision process for
eorganization plans? Does the decision to accept reorganization
lans lie with banks? Does it concern specifying collateral?
Giambona et al. (2013) argue that because there are different
lasses of debt, reorganization plans are often rejected in Chap-
er 11 proceedings. Previous works have also stressed that the
llocation of resources to different claimholders that is specified
n a recovery plan is as important as the potential value that the
estructuring will engender. Further, Brown (1989) argues that
roblems can rise in the presence of heterogeneous creditors.
Following these studies, we evaluate the likelihood of
pproval according to the categories of creditors. Accordingly,
s explanatory variables in our regressions we adopt the ratio of
ach debt category to the total debt and the number of creditors.
Concerning the restructuring process, Senbet and Wang
2010) state that creditors generally prefer asset liquidation,
ince such a procedure facilitates their ability to receive cash.
n our empirical model, we examine the effect of asset dis-
osal when a collateral asset for debt payment is specified in
he reorganization plan.
For this purpose, we run regressions with labor, secured and
nsecured debt as the explanatory variables and we model each
egression while controlling for a group of variables that each
ategory of creditors should consider in voting on the reorgani-
ation plan.
In addition to the amount of debt from heterogeneous credi-
ors mentioned above, we also consider the amount of secured
nd unsecured bank loans with claims at the creditors’ meet-
ng as a control measure. There is no consensus based on
mpirical evidence about the role of banks in the approval of
eorganization plans. According to Gilson (1990), Brown (1989)
nd James (1996), banks help reduce holdout and information
roblems in private restructuring. However, Helwege (1999)
rgues that bank debt is related to a slower debt restructu-
ing process. Although we cannot specify the expected sign for
ank debt in our empirical investigation, bank debt nevertheless
eems to be necessary to include as a control variable in our
egressions.
Finally, we also control for the period of time stated by the
rms by which to settle their debt, the type of firm, disparities in
ayment proposals among creditors and modifications in corpo-
ate ownership. Since the reorganization plan is made before
reditors vote, all explanatory variables are specified for the
l
e
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eriod before the acceptance, requested modification or rejection
f the plan.
Our first empirical model is designed for labor creditors. As
pecified earlier, such creditors are the first category of creditors
o receive any amount of money if a plan is rejected. According
o law, this category of creditors must receive payment from
ebtors within a one-year period. Hence, we do not need to run
 regression that controls for the period of time stated by the
rm to pay its debtholders for this group of creditors. Since
e include many of the same variables in subsequent equations
elow, we avoid repeating the definition of each variable for
ll the equations. Therefore, for each equation, we repeat the
efinition for the dependent variable and provide the definitions
or the control variables that were not mentioned for previous
quations.
We run a regression with both the portion of debt and number
f creditors as explanatory variables for the classes of creditors.
ur first equation is specified as follows:
t =  β0 +  β1Labor(%)t−1 +  β2Labor(#) +  β3Typet−1
+  β4Asset  Disposalt−1 +  β5Total  Debt(ln)t−1
+  β6Dif  Classest−1 +  β7Ownership  reorg  +  ut (1)
Yt = Pr(Y  = 1/X) = dummy variable that equals 1 if the reor-
anization plan is accepted without changes and 0 if it is
ither accepted with modifications suggested by the creditors
r rejected.
Labor (%) = ratio of labor debt to total debt. The variable
abor is the first class of the firm’s debt.
Labor (#) = this is the number (quantity) of labor debtholders.
Type = dummy variable that equals 1 for corporations (S.A
rms).
Asset Disposal = dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm
hooses a collateral asset for debt payment in the restructuring
lan.
Total Debt(ln) = the variable is measured as the logarithm of
he firm’s total debt.
Diff Classes = dummy variable that equals 1 for disparities in
he payment proposals among the three classes of claimholders.
Ownership Reorg = dummy variable that equals 1 for
hanges in corporate control.
In the first equation, we are interested in the sign of the
ariables labor and asset disposal. It is difficult to determine
ow labor creditors should behave with respect to reorganiza-
ion plans, since there are no observable conditions for which to
ontrol in the plan analysis, such as employment.
Labor creditors are the first category of creditors to receive
ayment in the case of bankruptcy: therefore, they have incen-
ives to reject the plan when creditors are perceived to have an
dvantage. Nevertheless, if workers believe in their firm and if
hey fear that they may face problems when returning to the
abor market, they have incentives to approve the plan. In this
quation, we expect only asset disposal to have a positive sign
wing to the guarantee of cash, as noted in Senbet and Wang
2010) and Giambona et al. (2013).
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According to Brown, James, and Mooradian (1994), evidence
ndicates that asset sales benefit creditors more than equity-
olders in cases of distress. Moreover, Asquith, Gertner, and
charfstein (1994) show that asset sales represent an impor-
ant means for firms to avoid bankruptcy. The null hypothesis
f our equations is that none of the variables mentioned below
nfluences the acceptance of the restructuring plan. Based on
revious works, we propose the following hypotheses:
ypothesis  H1.  Asset disposal may influence creditors to
ccept the reorganization plan. Therefore, we expect to find a
ositive sign for asset disposal in our regressions (β  > 0).
Hypothesis H1 must hold for all regressions in this paper.
ith regard to secured creditors, we believe that our task is
asier. Eq. (2) is specified as follows:
t =  β0 +  β1Secured(%)t−1 +  β2Secured(#)t−1 +  β3SBLt−1
+  β4Typet−1 +  β5Asset  Disposalt−1
+  β6Total  Debt(ln)t−1 +  β7Dif  Classest−1
+  β8Dif  Same  Class  +  β9Ownership  reorg
+ β10Pt−1 +  ut (2)
t = Pr(Y  = 1/X) = dummy variable that equals 1 if the reorganiza-
ion plan is accepted without changes and 0 if it is either accepted
ith modifications suggested by creditors or rejected.
Secured (%) = ratio of secured debt to total debt.
Secured (#) = this is the number (quantity) of secure debthold-
rs.
SBL = variable that specifies the portion of bank loans that
onstitute secured debt.
Dif Same Class = dummy variable that equals 1 for dispari-
ies in payment proposals within the same class of claimholders.
P = the variable Payment years is the period of time stated by
he firm to settle its debt.
Secured creditors own assets as collateral and receive
ayment after labor debtors in the case of bankruptcy. Therefore,
e believe that this category of creditors also has incentives to
eject the reorganization plan. According to Brouwer (2006),
ome countries attempt to attenuate the conflict that arises from
ecured creditors’ right to claim their collateral by applying an
utomatic stay. However, such a measure may not be sufficient
o convince creditors to accept the reorganization plan. In addi-
ion to the control variables included in the first equation, we
dded two more variables related to secured creditors’ decision
o accept the plan. For this kind of creditor, we believe that
he period of time stated by a firm to settle its debt and the
mount of secured bank loans can influence the likelihood that
he restructuring plan is accepted.
Therefore, we specify our second hypothesis as follows:
ypothesis H2.  Secured creditors have incentives to reject the
eorganization plan. Therefore, we expect to find a negative sign
or the coefficient of this variable (β  < 0).Finally, we analyze the same decision with respect to unse-
ured creditors. As these creditors are the last group of creditors
o receive any value from liquidation, they have incentives to
a
t
aSource: Own elaboration.
ccept the reorganization plan. The incentives of this class of
reditors are clearly more aligned with shareholders than those
f the other classes. Junior creditors are out of the money in
ost cases, and the decision to continue the business (even if it
s inefficient) can provide an upside for this class according to
ertner and Scharfstein (1991). Focusing on unsecured credi-
ors, Eq. (3) is specified as follows:
t =  β0 +  β1Un  sec ured(%)t−1 + β2Un  sec ured(#)t−1
+  β3UBLt−1 +  β4Typet−1 +  β5Asset  Disposalt−1
+  β6Total  Debt(ln)t−1 +  β7Dif  Classest−1
+  β8Dif  Same  Class  +  β9Ownership  reorg
+ β10Pt−1 +  υ  (3)
t = Pr(Y  = 1/X) = dummy variable that equals 1 if the reorganiza-
ion plan is accepted without changes and 0 if it is either accepted
ith modifications suggested by creditors or rejected.
Unsecured(%) = ratio of unsecured debt to total debt.
Unsecured (#) = this is the number (quantity) of unsecure
ebtholders.
UBL = unsecured bank loan indicates the portion of bank
oans that constitute unsecured debt.
We impose the same modification in Eq. (3) regarding the
eparation of the value and number criteria specified for the
revious equations. We present our third hypothesis as follows:
ypothesis  H3.  Unsecured creditors have incentives to
pprove the reorganization plan. Therefore, we expect to find
 positive sign for the coefficient of this variable (β  > 0).
mpirical  results  and  discussion
This section reports the empirical results from our descriptive
nd econometric analyses. Fig. 2 shows the portion of firms in
he sample per year.
We have more reorganization cases in 2012, 2009, 2013
nd 201, respectively. The sample shows only a few cases in
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Table 3
Quorum and vote analysis for the reorganizations.
Initially approved plans – quorum of votes
Measurement Percentiles Mean Std. Dev.
Smallest 25% 50% 75% Largest
Labor (%) 0 0.64 0.94 1 1 0.7684 0.3145
Secured (%) 0.75 1 1 1 1 0.971 0.078
Unsecured (%) 0.1 0.46 0.575 0.66 1 0.588 0.217
Initially approved plans – votes in favor of plan acceptance
Measurement Percentiles Mean Std. Dev.
Smallest 25% 50% 75% Largest
Labor (%) 0.96 1 1 1 1 0.998 0.0085
Secured (%) 0.53 0.68 1 1 1 0.8548 0.1875
Unsecured (%) 0.52 0.63 0.77 0.95 1 0.7647 0.1694
Modified plans – quorum of votes
Measurement Percentiles Mean Std. Dev.
Smallest 25% 50% 75% Largest
Labor (%) 0 0.51 0.725 0.97 1 0.6553 0.3111
Secured (%) 0.12 0.9 1 1 1 0.8954 0.2236
Unsecured (%) 0.01 0.535 0.75 0.855 1 0.675 0.26
Modified plans – votes in favor of acceptance (modified plan)
Measurement Percentiles Std. Dev.
Smallest 25% 50% 75% Largest Mean
Labor (%) 0.51 1 1 1 1 0.96 0.1047
Secured (%) 0.5 0.81 1 1 1 0.8956 0.1623
Unsecured (%) 0.52 0.65 0.8 0.91 1 0.7846 0.1591
Rejected plans –qorum of votes
Measurement Percentiles Mean Std. Dev.
Smallest 25% 50% 75% Largest
Labor (%) 0 0.16 0.57 1 1 0.5475 0.4093
Secured (%) 0.21 0.89 1 1 1 0.8981 0.2371
Unsecured (%) 0.23 0.42 0.53 0.84 1 0.6 0.2379
Rejected plans – votes in favor of rejecting the plan
Measurement Percentiles Std. Dev.
Smallest 25% 50% 75% Largest Mean
Labor (%) 0 0 0 0 1 0.1042 0.2854
Secured (%) 0.02 0.99 1 1 1 0.8984 0.2717
Unsecured (%) 0 0.46 0.68 0.85 1 0.6081 0.3085
Source: Own elaboration.
This table presents the percentage of a quorum and the outcome of the votes during the creditors’ general meeting for each possible result.
2
y
w
F
m
l
i
T014 because we stopped collecting data in the middle of the
ear.
Table 3 presents results regarding the quorum of creditors
ho voted on the plan during the creditors’ general meeting.
or approved plans without modifications, the results reveal that
ore secured creditors were present to vote on the plan than
h
fabor and unsecured creditors. However, the rate of acceptance
s higher among labor creditors than among the other classes.
he results for the modified plans are similar.Furthermore, the number of no shows at the vote is
igher among unsecured creditors for approved plans, yet
or modified and rejected plans, the number of no shows
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Table 4
Proposal for payment to claimholders.
A. Debtor’s proposal to claimholders
Approved
Measurement Percentiles Mean Std. Dev.
Smallest 25% 50% 75% Largest
Debt discount (% of Debt) 0 0 0.2 0.375 0.6 0.195 0.2092
Grace period (Months) 0 12 24 24 48 20.4 11.357
Modified
Measurement Percentiles Mean Std. Dev.
Smallest 25% 50% 75% Largest
Debt discount (% of Debt) 0 0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.27 0.2516
Grace period (Months) 0 9 12 24 60 15.92 13.11
Rejected
Measurement Percentiles Mean Std. Dev.
Smallest 25% 50% 75% Largest
Debt discount (% of Debt) 0 0 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.313 0.2739
Grace period (Months) 12 12 22 24 36 19.23 7.72
B. Correction form of the debt payment during the reorganization period
Correction form for the debt payment
Correction form Approved Modified Rejected
% of the total % of the total % of the total
Inflation (only) 23.08 10.26 41.18
Inflation + fixed interest rate 3.85 2.56 0.00
Fixed interest rate 19.23 17.95 5.88
Floating interest rate 23.08 43.59 35.29
N.I. 30.77 25.64 17.65
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Own elaboration.
This table shows the descriptive results for all payment proposals according to the results of the Assembly. Debt discount is the portion of debt discounted from the
original debt value. Grace period is the period from the plan vote to the first creditor’s payment. The variable N.I. indicates the portion of reorganization plans that
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tid not present a correction form for the debt payment.
mong labor creditors is similar to that among unsecured
reditors.
The analysis of rejected plans is interesting. Secured credi-
ors show the highest portion of rejections, while labor creditors
ejected the plan in only 10.42% (mean) of the cases in the
ample. In fact, when the plan was initially accepted the lowest
ortion of labor creditors to accept the plan is 96%. Thus, labor
reditors approved the plan in most of the cases, even when the
ther classes decided to reject it.
Table 4 shows the proposal of payment to claimholders
ccording to the outcome of the vote in the Assembly. The aver-
ge portion of debt discounted is higher for rejected plans, while
he average grace period (13.11 months) is higher for modified
lans.
Table 4, part B, also reveals that inflation indexes were used
s the main strategy for correcting debt payments for rejected
lans, while floating interest rates were the main strategy used
n the other cases.
fi
r
sRegarding the disparities in payment proposals, Table 5
hows that plans approved with no modifications are more
omogenous among claimholders. Moreover, modified plans
how the greatest disparities in payment proposals among
lasses, whereas rejected plans show the greatest disparities in
ayment proposals within the same class of creditors.
As shown for our first probit, regression in Table 6, the
oefficient for the variable Asset Disposal is positive and
ignificant. The interpretation of this result is quite simple,
ince having a greater amount of collateral for debt increases
he likelihood that the restructuring plan will be accepted.
laimholders vote on the plan within an environment of
ncertainty: therefore, it benefits all creditors to associate
n asset with collateral. This result thus seems to confirm
hat creditors generally prefer to liquidate a portion of the
rm’s assets, since such a procedure facilitates their ability to
eceive cash. This finding supports the first hypothesis of our
tudy.
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Table 5
Payment disparities.
Debt payment specification Approved Modified Rejected
Same class Among classes Same class Among classes Same class Among classes
% of all cases in the category
Debt discount 0 36 11.11 40.74 14.29 25
Grace period 8 0 9.26 25.93 10.71 21.43
Debt payment correction 0 12 1.85 16.67 3.57 3.57
Source: Own elaboration.
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either a positive or a negative sign.
Table 8 presents the same analysis for Eq. (3), where we focus
on the role of unsecured creditors.his table shows the disparities in payment proposals in the reorganization for th
he portion of different cases for each payment specification divided by the tota
The difference among classes is significant when year fixed
ffects are taken into account. However, we did not find signifi-
ant coefficients for the remaining variables.
The empirical results for the second equation are presented
n Table 7. As shown, the relationship between the portion of
ecured credit debt and the likelihood of acceptance is significant
nd negative. This result is in agreement with Senbet and Wang
2010) and Giambona et al. (2013).
As mentioned earlier, secured creditors seem to have incen-
ives to liquidate a company and to get their money back.
n addition to secured debt, asset disposal and disparities in
ayment proposals among the classes are significant in the
egression. The sign for asset disposal remains positive sign and
isparities in payment proposals among classes shows a negative
able 6
robit results for labor debt.
Plan Acceptance – Eq. (1) – labor decision
Labor – value and number criteria
ariables % and #
abor debt (%) −2.6129 −3.3078
(3.023) (3.0049)
abor debt (#) −00011 −0.0004
(0.00013) (0.0001)
ype 0.4516 0.5273
(0.2953) (0.4167)
sset Disposal 0.4674 0.5253**
(0.2953) (0.2642)
n Total Debt 0.1182 0.0833
(0.1183) (0.1103)
if Classes −0.5173* −0.3218
(0.3078) (0.2849)
wnership reorg 0.2927 0.4297
(0.3452) (0.3179)
onstant −2.2241 −1.998
(2.1135) (1.7945)
ear FE? Yes No
bservations 108 112
seudo-R2 0.1904 0.1506
his table shows the results for labor debt. Plan Acceptance is a dummy variable
hat takes the value of 1 if the reorganization plan is accepted without changes
nd 0 if the reorganization plan is either accepted with modifications suggested
y the creditors or rejected. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* Denote significance at the 10% level.
** Denote significance at the 5% level.
** Denote significance at the 1% level.
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se class of creditors and for three different classes of creditors. Disparities mean
ber of cases.
ign. Regarding payment years, one could expect a negative sign
n the regression because it represents the period of time stated
y the firms to settle their debt: therefore, a shorter period is
etter for claimholders. However, the coefficient is not statisti-
ally significant.
The coefficient of the variable secured bank loan is not statis-
ically significant. As explained earlier, this variable could showable 7
robit results for secured debt.
Plan Acceptance – Eq. (2) – secured decision
Secured – value and number criteria
ariables % and #
ecured debt (%) −1.6489* −1.2868
(0.9109) (0.8255)
ecured debt (#) 0.2671 0.0153
(0.421) (0.0377)
BL 0.2911 0.0245
(0.4044) (0.3587)
ype 0.3615 0.4368
(0.4563) (0.4239)
sset Disposal 0.6389* 0.7346**
(0.3306) (0.3062)
n Total Debt 0.1543 0.1347
(0.1167) (0.1085)
if Classes −0.5834* −0.3559
(0.3164) (0.2853)
if Same Class −0.3957 −0.3741
(0.3509) (0.3365)
wnership reorg 0.1657 0.3228
(0.3552) (0.3238)
ayment time years −0.0212 −0.02441
(0.036) (0.338)
onstant −2.7797 −2.449
(1.9251) (1.7047)
ear FE? Yes No
bservations 105 108
seudo-R2 0.1962 0.1558
his table shows the results for secured debt. Plan Acceptance is a dummy
ariable that takes the value of 1 if the reorganization plan is accepted without
hanges and 0 if the reorganization plan is either accepted with modifications
uggested by the creditors or rejected. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* Denote significance at the 10% level.
** Denote significance at the 5% level.
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Table 8
Probit results for unsecured debt.
Plan Acceptance – Eq. (3) – unsecured decision
Unsecured – value and number criteria
Variables % and #
Unsecured debt (%) 1.7764** 1.5624**
(0.8433) (0.7017)
Unsecured debt (#) −0.0015*** −0.0011***
(0.0005) (0.00044)
UBL −1.2891*** −1.2354**
(0.5548) (0.5386)
Type 0.7974 0.8046
(0.5167) (0.4732)
Asset Disposal 0.8123** 0.9548***
(0.3591) (0.3318)
Ln Total Debt 0.3729** 0.2716**
(0.1601) (0.4733)
Dif Classes −0.9174** −0.5668*
(0.3746) (0.3132)
Dif Same Class −0.6023 −0.4493
(0.3891) (0.3548)
Ownership reorg 0.2293 0.3628
(0.3972) (0.3572)
Payment time years −0.1793 −0.0306
(0.3799) (0.0357)
Constant −7.5088*** −5.348**
(2.8419) (2.2522)
Year FE? Yes No
Observations 105 108
Pseudo-R2 0.312 0.2588
This table shows the results for unsecured debt. Plan Acceptance is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the reorganization plan is accepted without
changes and 0 if the reorganization plan is either accepted with modifications
suggested by the creditors or rejected. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* Denote significance at the 10% level.
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** Denote significance at the 1% level.
As shown, the variable unsecured, measured as a portion of
nsecured debt to total debt, is positively related to the likelihood
hat the reorganization plan is accepted without modifications.
his result supports the third hypothesis of this paper. One can
lso see that the coefficient for the number of unsecured creditors
as a negative sign.
Increasing the number of creditors involved in the vote on a
eorganization plan can engender more coordination problems,
nd our results support such a statement. As explained earlier,
nsecured creditors have incentives to approve the restructu-
ing plan, since they receive payment after other creditors. The
oefficient for the variable asset disposal remains positive and
ignificant. Further, the coefficient for the difference among
lasses remains significant in the same direction. Since higher
evels of debt distance creditors from at-the-money positions in
he case of liquidation, we believe that the direction of the sign
s accurate.
In Tables 6–8, we investigate the likelihood that reorganiza-
ion plans are accepted when firms present them to claimholders
uring the creditors’ general meeting. We find evidence that
ore heterogeneous proposals among classes of claimholders
educes the likelihood of plan acceptance. Several complica-
ions may appear in situations where multiple creditors have
i
h
tment Journal 53 (2018) 49–62
ifferent interests and receive different contracts from the
rm. These issues have received considerable attention from
heoretical studies, such as Kordana and Posner (1999), Bris and
elch (2005) and von Thadden et al. (2010). Different interests
nd heterogeneous proposals can lead to a rejection of the reorga-
ization plan even when it appears to be good for the company as
 whole. Thus, our results are in line with the previous literature.
A higher portion of unsecured claims increases the likeli-
ood of plan acceptance. However, reorganization plans are less
ikely to be approved in cases of a greater number of unsecured
reditors. A higher concentration of debt in the hands of secured
reditors reduces the chances of plan acceptance. Gertner and
charfstein (1991) explain that the incentives of unsecured
reditors are more clearly aligned with shareholders than those
f the other classes. Junior creditors are out of the money in
ost cases, and the decision to continue the business (even if it
s inefficient) can provide an upside for this class. Therefore, they
ave incentives to approve the reorganization plan. Nevertheless,
ecured creditors have incentives to receive cash in accordance to
heir collateral level as quickly as possible. They might search
or better investment opportunities instead of waiting for the
istress resolution.
In Brazil, secured creditors are banks in most cases, which
as an important implication. Resolution 2.682/1999 from CVM
The Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil) specifies
hat banks must classify credits from approved reorganization
lans as category H. Therefore, it requires banks to provision
00% of the borrowed amount as a guarantee of operation;
his requirement reduces bank interest because they earn less
n this situation compared to another market alternatives. This
mplication is line with our results regarding secured credi-
ors (banks, in most of our cases) and unsecured bank loans in
ables 7 and 8.
In addition, divestment proposals increase the likelihood of
lan acceptance. This result is in line with Senbet and Wang
2010) and Giambona et al. (2013), who argue that higher levels
f asset liquidation facilitate the reorganization process. Brown
t al. (1994) also show that asset sales benefit creditors more
han equityholders in cases of distress.
oncluding  remarks
In this paper, we study the likelihood of acceptance of reor-
anization plans based on a sample of 120 Brazilian firms
or the period from 2005 to 2014. To our knowledge, this is
he first paper to evaluate the main drivers of the approval of
eorganization plans during the creditors’ meeting. Some impor-
ant results are notable in this paper. First, we show that asset
isposal facilitates the approval of reorganization plans as col-
ateral is an important determinant of recovery plan acceptance.
ndeed, collateral helps reduce a creditor’s loss expectations dur-
ng the set of challenges that a firm undergoing restructuring is
acing.Second, we confirm that secured debt creditors have lower
ncentives to accept reorganization plans. Since these creditors
ave a specific amount in collateral, they may prefer to liquidate
he company rather than wait for its recovery. Third, a higher
nage
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ortion of unsecured creditors seems to be related to higher
ikelihood of acceptance. Since these creditors are more sim-
lar to equityholders and are usually out of the money, they may
ave incentives to approve the plan even if doing so is not best
ecision for creditors as a whole.
This study also has some limitations. Unfortunately, we do
ot examine causality in this paper. However, since our purpose
n this study was to show the characteristics of reorganization
lans by the type of vote, our econometric results merely corrob-
rate our descriptive analysis by controlling for certain variables
how only the relation.
Future research can be conducted to analyze whether firms
hose reorganization plan was approved achieved success
hrough recovery. We could not analyze this issue in this paper
ecause most of the firms are still in recovery.
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